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____________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 This is an appeal from a district court order affirming 
the bankruptcy court's disallowance of AL Tech Specialty Steel 
Corporation's ("AL Tech") claim against Allegheny International, 
Inc. ("Allegheny International") in Allegheny International's 
Chapter 11 proceeding.  AL Tech's claim was based on certain 
environmental liabilities, under the federal Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
("CERCLA") and the New York Oil Spill Act, at two steel plants 
that it purchased from Allegheny International's corporate 
predecessor in 1976.  The bankruptcy court held that AL Tech's 
claim was not barred by either § 502(c) or § 502(e)(1)(B) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(c),(e)(1)(B), and it estimated 
the total remediation cost at the two plants for which Allegheny 
International might share responsibility at $12,792,000.  The 
bankruptcy court also ruled that Allegheny International's 
equitable share of AL Tech's federal liabilities was zero, 
primarily because of a dollar-for-dollar discount taken off the 
purchase price by the current owner of AL Tech's stock in 1989.  
It further held that the New York statute created a private right 
of action but that any action that AL Tech could bring against 
Allegheny International under the New York statute was time-
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barred.  The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order 
in all respects. 
 We conclude that there was insufficient evidence before 
the bankruptcy court to support the finding of a dollar-for-
dollar discount in the 1989 purchase of AL Tech by its current 
corporate parent and that any discount that may have been given 
accrued to the benefit of AL Tech's parent and not to AL Tech.  
We therefore reverse the order of the district court as it 
relates to Allegheny International's equitable share of AL Tech's 
federal environmental liabilities.  We also conclude that the 
bankruptcy court applied the wrong limitations period in 
assessing the portion of AL Tech's claim that relied on the New 
York statute.  However, in light of a 1995 decision by the New 
York Court of Appeals on the availability of a private right of 
action under the New York statute, we remand that issue for 
application of the holding of that decision to the present case. 
 We affirm the order of the district court as it relates to §§ 
502(c) and 502(e)(1)(B) and the bankruptcy court's estimation of 
remediation costs to be allocated between AL Tech and Allegheny 
International. 
 I. 
 The factual and procedural history of this case may be 
summarized as follows.  AL Tech bought two steel plants in 
Dunkirk and Watervliet, New York, from Allegheny International's 
predecessor, Allegheny Ludlum Industries ("Allegheny Ludlum"), in 
1976.  (Allegheny Ludlum had owned and operated the plants since 
1937.)  Since then, AL Tech's stock has been sold three times: in 
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1981, to GATX Corporation; in 1986, to Rio Algom, Inc. and Rio 
Algom Limited (collectively "Rio Algom"); and most recently (in 
1989) to Sammi Steel Company, Limited ("Sammi").  Environmental 
assessments of the two plants performed in the mid- and late 
1980s revealed numerous areas of contamination with oil, 
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), and other hazardous 
substances that would require costly remediation in order to come 
into compliance with applicable environmental statutes and 
regulations. 
 After Allegheny International filed a bankruptcy 
petition in 1988, AL Tech filed a timely proof of claim, alleging 
that Allegheny International was liable for a share of the 
incurred, contingent, and unliquidated response costs required to 
remediate the contamination at the two plants.  The bankruptcy 
court initially denied the claim, but its decision was reversed 
by the district court, In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 126 B.R. 919 
(W.D. Pa. 1991), and a panel of this court affirmed by judgment 
order, Allegheny Int'l, Inc. v. AL Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 
950 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1991) (table).  The case was remanded to 
the bankruptcy court for a trial to allow for estimation and 
allocation of AL Tech's claim.   
 On the basis of evidence presented at that 1992 trial, 
the bankruptcy court (1) estimated the allowable liabilities at 
$12,792,000, (2) found that Sammi had received a $22 million 
discount (3) held, primarily for that reason, that Allegheny 
International's equitable share of the cleanup costs was zero, 
and (4) held that AL Tech's Oil Spill Act claim was time-barred 
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by the applicable limitations period.  In re Allegheny Int'l, 
Inc., 158 B.R. 361 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).  The district court 
affirmed the bankruptcy court's order in its entirety.  AL Tech 
Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., No. 93-1445 (W.D. 
Pa. June 27, 1995).  This appeal followed. 
 On appeal, AL Tech argues that there was no discount; 
that if there was one, it was received by Sammi, not AL Tech; 
that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in focusing on 
only one equitable factor when it concluded that Allegheny 
International's equitable share was zero; that the bankruptcy 
court erred in finding that AL Tech failed to prove that 
Allegheny International was responsible for any of the PCB 
contamination at one of the contaminated sites, Willowbrook Pond; 
that the bankruptcy court underestimated response costs at 
Willowbrook Pond (at $1.3 million, versus AL Tech's estimate of 
approximately $14 million); and that the bankruptcy court applied 
the wrong limitations period and used the wrong triggering event 
in holding AL Tech's Oil Spill Act claim to be time-barred. 
 Allegheny International disagrees on every point and 
raises two independent grounds for affirming the district court: 
first, that AL Tech's claim is barred by Bankruptcy Code § 
502(e)(1)(B) because it is a contingent co-liability to the 
government, rather than a direct claim against Allegheny 
International; and second, that it should be disallowed pursuant 
to Bankruptcy Code § 502(c) because AL Tech has not taken 
sufficient steps to remove the contingencies (i.e., has not done 
enough to assess and clean up the contamination since 1976).  We 
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address Allegheny International's arguments first and then turn 
to AL Tech's arguments. 
 II. 
 Section 502(e)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
(e)(1) . . . [T]he court shall disallow any claim for 
reimbursement or contribution of an entity 
that is liable with the debtor on or has 
secured, the claim of a creditor, to the 
extent that -- 
. . . 
(B) such claim for reimbursement or contribution is 
contingent as of the time of allowance or 
disallowance of such claim for reimbursement 
or contribution. 
 
11 U.S.C. §§ 502(e)(1), (e)(1)(B).   
 Allegheny International argues that § 502(e)(1)(B) bars 
AL Tech's claim.  The bankruptcy court originally agreed with 
Allegheny International, but in its 1991 decision, the district 
court held that this section barred only contingent claims on 
which the claimant and the debtor are co-liable to a third party 
and that to the extent that AL Tech's claim against Allegheny 
International was based on CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.,1 it 
was not excluded because it was a direct claim against Allegheny 
International.  126 B.R. at 923-24.  This court affirmed the 
district court's order by judgment order.  950 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 
1991)(table).  On remand, the bankruptcy court considered itself 
bound by the district court's 1991 decision under the "law of the 
                     
1.  The parties did not brief the applicability of § 502(e)(1)(B) 
to AL Tech's Oil Spill Act claim in the earlier appeal to the 
district court.  In the present appeal, Allegheny International 
has again focused its arguments on the applicability of § 
502(e)(1)(B) to CERCLA claims, leaving the Oil Spill Act claim 
virtually unaddressed.  We thus read Allegheny International's 
argument as limited to AL Tech's CERCLA claim.   
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case" doctrine, and it thus declined Allegheny International's 
invitation to revisit the issue in light of two 1992 bankruptcy 
court decisions, In re Cottonwood Canyon Land Co., 146 B.R. 992 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1992), and In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 144 
B.R. 765 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992), aff'd, 164 B.R. 265 (S.D. Ohio 
1994).  158 B.R. at 367. 
 In this appeal, Allegheny International urges us to 
reexamine the question whether AL Tech's claim is barred by § 
502(e)(1)(B), but under the law of the case doctrine, we believe 
that it would be inappropriate for us to do so.  Under the law of 
the case doctrine, an appellate court should generally decline to 
reconsider a question that was decided in a prior appeal.  See 18 
Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478, 
at 788 (1981 & 1996 Supp.).  "The doctrine is not a 
jurisdictional limitation; rather, it `merely expresses the 
practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been 
decided.'"  Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 
1131, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Messenger v. Anderson, 225 
U.S. 436, 444 (1912)).  Accordingly, it is appropriate for an 
appellate court to reconsider a decision made in an earlier 
appeal in exceptional circumstances, such as where there has been 
an intervening change in the law, where new evidence has become 
available, or where reconsideration is necessary to prevent clear 
error or a manifest injustice.  18 Charles A. Wright, et al., 
supra, § 4478, at 790.   
 In this case, the panel that heard the prior appeal 
necessarily decided that AL Tech's claim was not barred by § 
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502(e)(1)(B).  The law of the case doctrine applies to this 
decision even though it was rendered by judgment order because 
that doctrine "applies both to issues expressly decided by a 
court in prior rulings and to issues decided by necessary 
implication."  Bolden v. SEPTA, 21 F.3d 29, 31 (3d Cir. 1994); 
see also United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 974 F.2d 315, 329-
30 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying doctrine to judgment order).   
 Moreover, we do not believe that there are exceptional 
circumstances here that make it appropriate to reconsider the 
prior panel's decision.  While Allegheny International points to 
two intervening bankruptcy court decisions that disagree with the 
district court's decision in this case, those decisions do not 
represent the type of authority necessary to invoke the exception 
that applies when there has been an intervening change in the 
law.  Nor do those decisions convince us that a refusal to 
reconsider the issue would amount to clear error or a manifest 
injustice.   
 We likewise reject Allegheny International's argument 
that this court's opinion in In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 944 
F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992), 
represents an intervening change in the law sufficient to relax 
the usual strictures of the law of the case doctrine.  There are 
two problems with Allegheny International's argument.  First, 
while the decision in Penn Central came after the district 
court's 1991 decision, it was handed down more than two months 
before the filing of judgment order by which this court affirmed 
the district court's order.  Second, the Penn Central decision 
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did not directly address the issue at hand but rather concerned 
the government's ability to assert CERCLA claims against a 
reorganized debtor where the consummation order, which protected 
the reorganized debtor against lawsuits based on the debtor's 
activities, predated the enactment of CERCLA.  Accordingly, we 
believe that it is inappropriate in this case to reconsider the 
merits of Allegheny International's § 502(e)(1)(B) argument. 
 Allegheny International also argues that § 502(c) of 
the Bankruptcy Code precludes estimation of AL Tech's claim 
because AL Tech has not taken sufficient steps to remove the 
contingencies in its claim, i.e., has not done enough to assess 
and remediate the various contamination problems at its plants.  
We agree with the district court that this argument must fail.  
The cases that Allegheny International cites do not support its 
position.  All three cases, Kessler v. Jefferson Storage Corp., 
125 F.2d 108 (6th Cir. 1941), In re Hot Springs Broadcasting, 
Inc., 210 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Ark. 1962), and In re KDI Corp., 119 
B.R. 594 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990), concern § 57(d) of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provided that unliquidated claims 
were not to be allowed where liquidation would unduly delay the 
administration of the estate.  Thus, a claimant had the burden of 
liquidating its claim as a condition precedent to its allowance. 
 By contrast, § 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code specifically 
provides for estimation, for purposes of allowance, of such 
unliquidated claims.  The three cases are also factually 
distinguishable from the present case; for instance, the claimant 
in KDI Corp. was denied permission to amend a claim filed 12 
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years earlier, after it had waited eight years before even 
seeking permission to amend.  As the bankruptcy court noted, the 
law does not require that all contingencies be removed, and AL 
Tech has taken some steps to remove the contingencies in its 
claim. 
 III. 
 AL Tech's principal arguments on appeal concern the 
bankruptcy court's determination of Allegheny International's 
equitable share of AL Tech's allowable CERCLA liabilities.  After 
estimating AL Tech's response costs to total $12,792,000, the 
bankruptcy court proceeded to determine Allegheny International's 
equitable share of those costs pursuant to § 113(f) of CERCLA, 
which authorizes a court to allocate response costs among 
responsible parties "using such equitable factors as [it] 
determines are appropriate."  42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).  The court 
considered a number of factors, but its ultimate conclusion -- 
that Allegheny International's equitable share was zero -- was 
based on its findings that Sammi was fully aware of AL Tech's 
future environmental liabilities and that, as a result, Sammi 
"discounted the purchase price dollar for dollar until the total 
purchase price was $1.00" and thus "held no real expectation that 
[Allegheny International] would pay for any portion of the 
remediation costs."  158 B.R. at 383.  AL Tech argues that there 
is no record evidence, let alone sufficient evidence, to support 
such findings and that, even if there were such a discount, the 
beneficiary of that discount was not AL Tech, the claimant in 
this case, but Sammi. 
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 With respect to this issue, the following facts are 
undisputed or at least beyond dispute under a clearly erroneous 
standard.  Sammi was aware of $22 million in environmental 
liabilities on the part of AL Tech when it purchased AL Tech's 
stock in 1989.  An agreement among Rio Algom, Sammi, and AL Tech 
provided for an adjustment to the purchase price in the event of 
changes in AL Tech's net worth.  At the time of the sale, AL Tech 
and Sammi "accrued" $22 million in expenses to cover future 
environmental liabilities; these were charged against sales 
during the first seven months of 1989.  This substantially 
reduced the net worth of AL Tech,2 and after litigation and 
arbitration over the propriety of this accounting procedure, Rio 
Algom was required to pay Sammi in excess of $5 million to assume 
ownership of AL Tech.3  Of this amount, $2.4 million was awarded 
to Sammi to account for the increased environmental liabilities. 
 AL Tech argues that there was insufficient evidence to 
show that Sammi reduced the sale price dollar for dollar to 
account for the $22 million in liabilities of which it was aware 
at the time of the transaction.  Allegheny International relies 
on the testimony of two officers of AL Tech: Ronald Hansen, the 
chief financial officer, and James Mintun, the chief executive 
officer.  Both Hansen and Mintun testified that the environmental 
                     
2.  AL Tech points out that the net worth of its stock on the 
date of purchase was approximately negative $16 million.  A. 
1515.  Thus, it argues, even considering the subsequent 
adjustment in the purchase price, Sammi overpaid for AL Tech's 
stock by some $11 million. 
3.  The parties cite a figure of $5.3 million, while the 
bankruptcy court quoted the figure of $6.5 million. 
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liabilities reduced AL Tech's value and reduced the purchase 
price, A. 301, 303, 325-27, and Hansen testified that these 
liabilities brought the purchase price down "[a]pproximately 
dollar for dollar."  A. 327.  However, Hansen also testified that 
he had "absolutely no idea whatsoever how [the purchase price] 
was arrived at," A. 335, and had not come to know the reason for 
the one dollar purchase price, A. 322, and Mintun likewise 
testified that he had no knowledge of how the price was arrived 
at.  A. 398.  Mintun also testified that neither he nor Hansen 
participated in any of the discussions concerning the price to be 
paid for AL Tech, A. 398-99, and Hansen testified that he had no 
involvement in determining what the purchase price would be.  A. 
323; see also A. 335 (Hansen testifying that he "[did] not know 
specifically what Sammi paid in fact for AL Tech or what was 
going through their mind and how they arrived at that"). 
 Also of some relevance is the fact that the agreement 
for the sale of AL Tech to Sammi makes reference to the proof of 
claim that AL tech had filed against Allegheny International.  A. 
1415.4  Allegheny International points out that this claim was 
                     
4.  In a reference to possible recoupment from GATX, the notes 
accompanying AL Tech's financial statements also refer to its 
management's belief that: 
 
part of [the $22 million] environmental liability may 
be recovered through negotiations or 
litigation with certain of the Company's 
previous owners.  Because of the uncertainty, 
no recognition has been given to a recovery 
of these liabilities in the accompanying 
financial statements. 
 
A. 1582. 
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not identified as an asset on AL Tech's balance sheets.  In 
addition, the schedule of the sale agreement in which it appears 
seems designed to disclose pending or threatened litigation that 
might result in judgments against AL Tech.  See A. 1331.  Still, 
on the basis of the sale agreement, it is clear that Sammi was 
aware of the existence of AL Tech's claim against Allegheny 
International. 
 A reduction in the purchase price of a facility is 
certainly a valid factor to be considered in allocating CERCLA 
response costs among responsible parties, see, e.g., Smith Land & 
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989), and the amount of the 
discount is, of course, important, id.  On the record before the 
bankruptcy court, however, we do not think that there was 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the discount 
received by Sammi equalled $22 million.  The testimony of Hansen 
and Mintun reflects, at best, informed speculation as to the 
existence and magnitude of any discount in the price paid by 
Sammi for AL Tech's stock. 
 An even more fundamental issue raised by AL Tech is 
whether any discount received by Sammi in its purchase of AL Tech 
from Rio Algom should be reflected in a dispute that involves 
neither Sammi nor Rio Algom, but rather AL Tech and Allegheny 
International.  AL Tech point out that Smith Land and all of the 
other cases cited by Allegheny International and the bankruptcy 
court -- Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 
1989); BTR Dunlop, Inc. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 1992 WL 159203 
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(N.D. Ill. June 29, 1992); South Fla. Water Management Dist. v. 
Montalvo, 1989 WL 260215 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 1989); and Southland 
Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J.), modified 
on reconsideration, 1988 WL 125855 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 1988) -- 
involved allocation between the seller and the purchaser of the 
subject property (or their successors, see Smith Land, 851 F.2d 
at 88).  Here, the seller (Rio Algom) is not in the picture; 
Allegheny International's predecessor received full value for the 
plants when it sold them to AL Tech in 1976 for $23.5 million in 
cash and stock.  A. 647-702 (purchase agreement).  In addition, 
AL Tech, not Sammi, is the claimant here, and under traditional 
corporate law principles the two companies are considered 
separate entities.  Thus, even if it is assumed that there was a 
discount in the 1986 sale, this discount would work against Sammi 
and in favor of Rio Algom, but it does not necessarily work 
against AL Tech and in favor of Allegheny International. 
 Allegheny International's counterargument is that the 
bankruptcy court properly disregarded corporate forms in light of 
AL Tech's status as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sammi.  
Allegheny International cites several cases describing bankruptcy 
courts as courts of equity that will disregard legal fictions 
when justice requires.  The problem here is that the bankruptcy 
court did not find that justice required that it regard Sammi and 
AL Tech as a single entity.  In the absence of such a finding, it 
was error to assume, as the bankruptcy court appears to have 
done, that any windfall reaped by Sammi should be imputed to AL 
Tech.   
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 Nor do we believe, on the record before us, that such a 
finding would be warranted.  Allegheny International has pointed 
to no facts that would allow the piercing of the corporate veil. 
 Without sufficient facts of record to warrant veil-piercing, 
i.e., facts of sufficient dominance of the affairs of the 
subsidiary by the parent corporation, AL Tech and Sammi must be 
considered separate entities.  See In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108, 
1116-17 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro 
Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 643 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[T]here 
is a presumption that a corporation, even when it is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of another, is a separate entity."), cert. 
denied, 503 U.S. 937 (1992). 
 AL Tech also argues that the bankruptcy court abused 
its discretion in relying exclusively on a single equitable 
factor -- the discount received by Sammi -- in deciding that 
Allegheny International's equitable share of the cleanup cost was 
zero.  It is within the court's discretion to rely on a single 
factor, see Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 
F.2d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 1992), but here the court also considered 
several other factors, e.g., actual years of ownership and 
operation of the two plants, 158 B.R. at 383, Allegheny Ludlum's 
compliance with federal environmental laws that were in effect 
before it sold the plants to AL Tech, id. at 384, and AL Tech's 
less-than-enthusiastic cleanup efforts since the sale, id.  
However, it is clear to us that the bankruptcy court's ultimate 
conclusion can be justified only on the basis of the discount, as 
the bankruptcy court itself seemed to recognize.  See id. at 383 
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("[T]his court considers the discounted purchase price for the AL 
Tech steel plants to be the most compelling and dispositive 
allocation factor in this case.").  Other factors may weigh in 
Allegheny International's favor, but they are insufficient to 
drive Allegheny International's equitable share down to zero.  In 
other words, it was inconsistent with the sound exercise of its 
discretion for the bankruptcy court to rely, not simply on a 
single factor, but on a single factor where the factual finding 
underlying the factor was clearly erroneous. 
 AL Tech raises two arguments with respect to 
Willowbrook Pond, a cooling pond at the Dunkirk plant that is 
contaminated with PCBs.5  First, AL Tech argues that the 
bankruptcy court erred in concluding that it failed to prove, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that Allegheny International (as 
successor to Allegheny Ludlum) is responsible for any of the PCB 
contamination.  Second, AL Tech argues that the bankruptcy court 
committed reversible error in choosing Allegheny International's 
estimate of the response costs at Willowbrook Pond ($1.3 million) 
instead of AL Tech's estimate (approximately $14 million). 
 We find no fault in the bankruptcy court's 
determination on the liability question here.  AL Tech presented 
no reports, analyses, or other documentation of the use of PCB-
containing materials at the plants during the period when the 
plants were owned by Allegheny Ludlum.  AL Tech's evidence 
                     
5.  The sediments in the pond also contain high levels of nickel, 
but the dispute here concerns responsibility for, and remediation 
of, the PCB problem. 
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consisted of the testimony of Edwin Diehl and Morton Parker, 
neither of whom could establish that the materials used by 
Allegheny International before the purchase of the plants by AL 
Tech contained PCBs.  Mr. Diehl, AL Tech's Director of 
Engineering (and previously its Director of Environmental 
Affairs), pointed to a hydraulic fluid, first used in new rolling 
mill machinery in 1970, as the source of the PCBs in Willowbrook 
Pond.  A. 437-40, 454, 457.  He had no personal knowledge, 
however, as to whether the fluid contained PCBs. 
 Mr. Parker visited the Dunkirk plant in the mid-1970s 
to determine whether oils and greases that Allegheny Ludlum had 
collected from Willowbrook Pond were suitable for reclamation by 
his employer, Wallover Oil Company.  A. 465-69.  He testified 
that Allegheny Ludlum had recently switched to a new hydraulic 
fluid that did not contain PCBs, that the fluid previously used 
sank because it was heavier than water, and that fluids that 
contained PCBs also were heavier than water and sank.  A. 467-69. 
 Mr. Parker also testified that his company rejected Allegheny 
Ludlum's oils and greases for reclamation and that, while PCB 
contamination was the reason for most such rejections, he did not 
recall the reason for rejecting Allegheny Ludlum's materials.  A. 
470-72.  Mr. Parker also could not recall the results of any 
chemical analyses done on the materials from Willowbrook Pond.  
A. 470.  Nor could he recall the year in which he visited the 
plant or the name of anyone whom he met there.  A. 466.  Like Mr. 
Diehl, then, Mr. Parker could provide no specific information as 
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to whether any materials used by Allegheny Ludlum before the 1976 
sale of the plants to AL Tech contained PCBs. 
 It may well be that Allegheny Ludlum used PCB-
containing materials during the relevant period, and it may be 
that the only reasonable explanation for the presence of PCBs in 
the pond sediments, based on the evidence adduced, is that 
Allegheny Ludlum dumped them there.  But that is different from 
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Allegheny 
International is responsible for at least some of the 
contamination.  This AL Tech failed to do.  In light of this 
conclusion, it is not necessary to reach AL Tech's second 
argument regarding Willowbrook Pond. 
 IV. 
 We deal last with two related questions concerning AL 
Tech's claim under the New York Oil Spill Act, N.Y. Nav. Law §§ 
171-197 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1996).  First, may AL Tech bring 
an action against Allegheny International under the Oil Spill 
Act?  Second, is any such action time-barred?  Because our 
decision concerning these questions of New York law is unlikely 
to have much precedential significance, we will deal with them in 
an abbreviated fashion.    
 A.   Under White v. Long, 650 N.E.2d 836 (N.Y. 1995), a 
case not considered by either the bankruptcy court or the 
district court, it is clear that a property owner may under 
certain conditions sue a prior owner to recover cleanup costs.  
The claim in White was asserted under § 181(5), which provides as 
follows: 
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Any claim by any injured person for the costs 
of cleanup and removal and direct and 
indirect damages based on the strict 
liability imposed by this section may be 
brought directly against the person who has 
discharged the petroleum, provided, however, 
that damages recoverable by any injured 
person in such a direct claim based on the 
strict liability imposed by this section 
shall be limited to the damages authorized by 
this section. 
N.Y. Nav. Law § 181(5) (McKinney Supp. 1996).   
 Another provision of the Act defines a "claim" as "any 
claim by an injured person, who is not responsible for the 
discharge."  N.Y. Nav. Law § 172(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996) 
(emphasis added).  Noting this definition, the New York Court of 
Appeals wrote in White: 
Although even faultless owners of 
contaminated lands have been deemed 
"dischargers" for purposes of their own 
section 181(1) liability,[6] where they have 
not caused or contributed to (and thus are 
not "responsible for") the discharge, they 
should not be precluded from suing those who 
have actually caused or contributed to such 
damage.  To preclude reimbursement in that 
situation would significantly diminish the 
reach of section 181(5). 
 
650 N.E.2d at 838 (footnote added). 
 Since neither the bankruptcy court nor the district 
court has applied White to the facts of this case, we remand AL 
Tech's Oil Spill Act claim so that this can be done.7   
                     
6.  This provision states in pertinent part that "[a]ny person 
who has discharged petroleum shall be strictly liable, without 
regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs and all direct 
and indirect damages, no matter by whom sustained, as defined in 
this section."  N.Y. Nav. Law § 181(1)(McKinney Supp. 1996).  
7.  AL Tech originally argued that its claim arose under N.Y. 
Nav. Law § 176(8), which provides: 
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 B.  On the issue of the statute of limitations, under 
the New York Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Stewart's Ice 
Cream, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1184 (N.Y. 1984), it appears that AL 
Tech's claim is governed by the six-year limitations period for 
actions on express or implied contracts, N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 
§ 213(2) (McKinney 1990).  In Stewart's Ice Cream, the state paid 
for the cleanup and removal of discharged petroleum and then 
sought to recover its expenses from the party that caused the 
discharge.  The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the 
state's claim was one for indemnity and that liability on an 
indemnity claim "theoretically springs from an implied contract." 
 Id. at 1186.  The court further held that the state's claim was 
not covered by the three-year limitations period for actions to 
recover on a liability created or imposed by a statute, N.Y. Civ. 
Prac. L. & R. § 214(2) (McKinney 1990), because that provision 
(..continued) 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary . . 
. every person providing cleanup, removal of 
discharge of petroleum or relocation of 
persons pursuant to this section shall be 
entitled to contribution from any other 
responsible party. 
 
 AL Tech now argues that its claim arises "under both 
Section 176(8) and Section 181(5)," see Appellant's Br. at 46 
n.22, and that White v. Long, supra, which was based on § 181(5), 
"settled definitively" its right to bring a private action.  
Appellant's Br. at 44 n.20.  AL Tech does not argue that there is 
any difference between the right of action created by § 181(5) 
and the right of action that it has asserted under § 176(8).  We 
therefore do not decide whether there is an independent private 
right of action under § 176(8) or whether any such action differs 
in scope from the right of action under § 181(5).  On remand, the 
bankruptcy and district courts need only apply White to the facts 
of this case. 
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applies only to liability not recognized in the common or 
decisional law and because it could not be said that the state's 
claim "would not exist but for the statute."  Stewart's Ice 
Cream, 473 N.E.2d at 1187.   
 In this case, AL Tech's claim appears to be in the 
nature of a claim for indemnity.  Stewart's Ice Cream is arguably 
distinguishable on the ground that there the court held that the 
Oil Spill Act did not "expressly provide for an indemnity action 
such as [the one brought by the state]," 473 N.E.2d 1186, whereas 
here § 181(5) does expressly provide for AL Tech's claim.  
However, Stewart's Ice Cream made this point to refute the 
argument that N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(2) furnished the 
applicable statute of limitations.  Since Allegheny International 
does not contend this provision applies here, this arguable 
distinction need not concern us.8   Thus, we hold that Stewart's 
Ice Cream governs here.  See 145 Kisco Ave. Corp. v. Dufner 
Enters., Inc., 604 N.Y.S.2d 963 (App. Div. 1993). 
                     
8.  Moreover, while § 181(5) expressly authorizes Al Tech's 
claim, the right of indemnity also has roots in common law, 
although it is also sometimes imposed by statute.  See 23 N.Y. 
Jur. 2d Contribution, Indemnity, and Subrogation § 2 (1982).   
    The conclusions reached above also follow if AL Tech's claim 
is characterized as one for contribution rather than indemnity.  
It appears well settled under New York law that contribution, 
like indemnity, is based on an implied contract.  Hard v. Mingle, 
99 N.E. 542, 544 (N.Y. 1912); Blum v. Good Humor Corp., 394 
N.Y.S.2d 894, 896 (App. Div. 1977).  Furthermore, contribution 
existed at common law.  Mingle, 99 N.E. 542.  Consequently, the 
six-year limitations period for actions on contracts would apply. 
 Blum, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 896; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Société 
Coiffure, Inc., 50 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1944). 
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 We reject Allegheny International's argument that AL 
Tech's claim is subject to the three-year statute of limitations 
for actions to recover for damages or injuries to property.  See 
N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(4) (McKinney 1990).  The cases upon 
which Allegheny International principally relies9 -- State v. 
King Serv., Inc., 563 N.Y.S.2d 331 (App. Div. 1990), and Town of 
Guilderland v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 552 N.Y.S.2d 704 (App. 
Div. 1990) -- involved claims that differ from those asserted by 
AL Tech.  The claim in Town of Guilderland was explicitly for 
property damage, viz., damage to the town's sewer system that 
resulted from an explosion of fumes from gasoline that had leaked 
into the sewers, rather than one for reimbursement of cleanup 
costs.  The claim at issue in King Service was also one for 
direct damages under § 190 of the Act, which covers actions 
against insurers.  See N.Y. Nav. Law § 190 (McKinney 1989).  On 
balance, we believe that Stewart's Ice Cream is a closer fit in 
this case than the decisions on which Allegheny International 
relies.  We thus hold that the statute of limitation for AL 
Tech's Oil Spill Act claim is six years. 
                     
9.  Allegheny also cites two additional cases that are of limited 
relevance to the present appeal: Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. 
Co., 335 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1975), which applied the three-year 
limitations periods for actions for property damage and personal 
injury to cases based on strict product liability; and P.B.N. 
Assocs. v. Xerox Corp., 529 N.Y.S.2d 877 (App. Div. 1988), order 
modified on reargument, 575 N.Y.S.2d 451 (App. Div. 1991), which 
applied the three-year limitations period for actions for 
property damage to an action for waste stemming from an oil 
spill.  Neither case involved the Oil Spill Act or an action for 
indemnity or contribution. 
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 Furthermore, it is settled law in New York that an 
action for indemnity or contribution does not generally accrue 
until the payment is made by the party seeking recovery.  Bay 
Ridge Air Rights, Inc. v. State, 375 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1978).  AL 
Tech may thus seek to recover cleanup costs under the Oil Spill 
Act that it incurred within six years prior to its filing of its 
proof of claim against Allegheny International.  To the extent 
that AL Tech is seeking to recover for future remediation 
costs,10 the limitations period has not yet begun.11   
 
 V. 
 For the reasons stated above, we reverse the order of 
the district court as it relates to the bankruptcy court's 
finding of a discount in the price paid by Sammi in 1989 and as 
it relates to the bankruptcy court's determination of Allegheny 
International's equitable share of AL Tech's allowable response 
costs, and we remand for reconsideration of equitable allocation 
without the discount.  We reverse the order of the district court 
as it relates to the limitations period applicable to AL Tech's 
                     
10.  The bankruptcy court appears to have allowed only those 
costs related to future remediation efforts. 
11.  The bankruptcy court disallowed as time-barred only AL 
Tech's claim related to the Oil Contamination Area.  158 B.R. at 
377-78.  However, AL Tech's claims related to three other areas -
- the Pump House and Aboveground Fuel Tank, the Underground Fuel 
Tanks, and the Kromma Kill -- are also based on petroleum 
contamination.  158 B.R. at 368.  Given CERCLA's petroleum 
exclusion, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), the Oil Spill Act may be the 
only basis for liability at those locations.  We thus point out 
that our conclusion concerning the applicable limitations period 
applies to any of AL Tech's claims involving petroleum 
contamination. 
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claim under the New York Oil Spill Act, and we remand for 
application of the standard set out in the New York Court of 
Appeals' decision in White v. Long to the facts of this case.  We 
affirm the order of the district court as it relates to the 
bankruptcy court's determination that Bankruptcy Code §§ 502(c) 
and 502(e)(1)(B) do not bar AL Tech's claim and as it relates to 
the bankruptcy court's determination that AL Tech failed to prove 
that Allegheny International was responsible for any of the 
cleanup costs at Willowbrook Pond. 
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